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Humenansky v. Regents of the University of
Minnesota: Questioning Congressional Intent and
Authority to Abrogate Eleventh Amendment
Immunity with the ADEA
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.”1 Although the Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity far beyond the boundaries of the amendment’s actual text,2
state immunity from suits brought by private citizens in federal court is not absolute. One limitation to Eleventh Amendment immunity arises from the power of Congress to enforce
equal protection rights.3 Congress may abrogate the states’
immunity through legislation.4 To do so, however, it must (1)
provide within the language of the statute an “unmistakably
clear” statement of its intent to revoke state immunity to
claims arising under that legislation, and (2) properly enact the
immunity-abrogating statute pursuant to its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Seven federal circuits have concluded that Congress properly manifested its intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh

1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
2. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 5 states, “The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” Id. Another
limitation to Eleventh Amendment immunity is a State’s ability to waive its immunity
by enacting state legislation or by participating in a particular federal program. See
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). In addition, the Eleventh
Amendment does not prohibit federal court actions brought to enjoin the enforcement
of an unconstitutional statute by a State official. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
159-60 (1908).
4. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241-43.
5. Id. at 242-43.
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Amendment immunity when it amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA” or “Age Act”)6 to include the
states within the definition of potentially liable employers.7
Conversely, a minority of circuits have held that the language
of the Age Act does not contain an effective expression of congressional intent.8 In Humenansky v. Regents of the University
of Minnesota, for example, the Eighth Circuit held that the
ADEA fails to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in part because the statute does not contain a plain statement of intent
in any single section within the text, nor a direct reference to
the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity.9
The circuit split over whether Congress properly manifested
its intent to abrogate state immunity is a product of the courts’
diverging interpretations of the “unmistakably clear” requirement referred to above and originally set forth in Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon.10 This Note will attempt to clarify
the Atascadero standard for expressing congressional intent by
analyzing the Humenansky decision. Part II will review the
history of the Eleventh Amendment, noting several landmark
cases that have expanded or restricted the scope of the
amendment during the last two centuries. Part II will also provide a brief introduction to the ADEA. Part III will summarize
the facts of the Humenansky case and the court’s conclusions.
Part IV will analyze the Humenansky decision as it relates to
the intent requirement for Eleventh Amendment abrogation.
By examining the language of the ADEA in light of several
statutes that have previously been held by the Supreme Court
to possess sufficient or insufficient manifestations of congressional intent, this section will provide a framework for analyzing statutory language that purports to deprive the states of
their immunity. This part will also demonstrate that, in light of
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-30 (1994).
7. See Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1998); Keeton v.
University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998); Hurd v. Pittsburg State
Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1997); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77
F.3d 690, 695 (3d Cir. 1996); Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Servs.,
945 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1991); Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th
Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 701 (1st Cir. 1983).
8. See Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822,
824-25 (8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No.
98-1235); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999).
9. See id. at 824-25.
10. See Atascadero State Hosp. V. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985).
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this multi-statute comparison, the ADEA does in fact possess a
sufficiently clear expression of intent to abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity to ADEA suits. Section B of
Part IV will demonstrate that the ADEA also meets the second
prong of the Eleventh Amendment abrogation test—it was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.11 Finally, Part
V will conclude that the Supreme Court, if faced with the issue,
should reject the Humenansky court’s position on both the authority and intent issues and hold that the ADEA does effectively abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
1. Inception of the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted in response to the
1793 Supreme Court decision, Chisholm v. Georgia.12 In Chisholm, a South Carolina citizen, acting as executor for a deceased South Carolina citizen, sued the State of Georgia for the
value of military supplies which the deceased had sold to the
State.13 Georgia challenged the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over suits between a state and citizens of another
state,14 but the Court held that states were subject to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under both Article III, section 2 of the Constitution,15 and the Judiciary Act of 1789.16
11. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996). The Court recognized that “the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the preexisting balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. The fact that the Eleventh Amendment may be abrogated
through Fourteenth Amendment legislation does not justify limiting the Eleventh
Amendment on the basis of constitutional provisions that predate the Eleventh
Amendment. See id.
12. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
13. See id. at 420.
14. See id. at 419.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This section provides in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, . . . to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or
more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—[and] between
Citizens of different States . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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Within two days of the Chisholm decision, a resolution, now
codified as the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, was
introduced in the House of Representatives.17 The proposal
provided that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”18
2. Supreme Court expansion of the Eleventh Amendment
Almost a century later, the Supreme Court first expanded
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment.19 In Hans v. Louisiana,
a Louisiana citizen sued the State of Louisiana for damages
arising out of a contract for the sale of state-issued bonds.20
Reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to embody the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity that existed at the time the Constitution was ratified, the Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment is not limited to the scope of its
actual text.21 The Court extended the amendment to preclude
suits brought against a state by its own citizens, regardless of
whether the claim originated under federal or state law.22
3. Exceptions to the Supreme Court’s expanded interpretation of
sovereign immunity
Following Hans, however, the Supreme Court constricted
the scope of sovereign immunity by carving out several exceptions to the Court’s previously broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. As a result, the Eleventh Amendment no
longer precludes suits for prospective relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law.23 In Ex parte Young,
shareholders of various railroads sued the State of Minnesota
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789) (repealed 1948).
17. See Kenneth S. Weitzman, Comment, Copyright and Patent Clause of the
Constitution: Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment
Sovereign Immunity After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
297, 302 n.17 (1991).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
19. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 12-15.
22. See id.
23. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
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in federal court, alleging that state legislation regulating railroad rates was confiscatory and violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.24 The Court held,
If the act which the state . . . seeks to enforce [is] a violation of
the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such
enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official
or representative character and is subjected in his person to
the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to
the supreme authority of the United States.25

The Supreme Court has also held that states may waive
their immunity by consenting to federal jurisdiction,26 and, as
will be shown, states are no longer protected from suits by private citizens in federal court where Congress manifests an intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment while legislating
pursuant to its constitutional powers.27
4. Restricting congressional authority to abrogate state
immunity
In 1985, the Eleventh Amendment pendulum swung again
in favor of the states when the Supreme Court made it more
difficult for Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.28
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon involved a plaintiff whose
application for employment was rejected by a state hospital.29
The applicant sued under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, alleging that the hospital discriminated against him by refusing to
hire him because of his disabilities.30 The hospital moved for
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the federal court from jurisdiction over the
claim.31 Granting the state hospital’s motion, the Supreme
Court held that Congress could not abrogate the states’ immunity unless it manifested “its intention to abrogate the Elev24. See id. at 123-26.
25. Id. at 159-60.
26. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 235 (1985); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890).
27. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
28. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 278.
29. See id. at 236.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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enth Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.”32
In 1996, the Supreme Court further limited congressional
abrogation power by holding, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, that
Eleventh Amendment immunity may be nullified only through
Fourteenth Amendment legislation.33 In an earlier decision, the
Supreme Court had taken a broader view of Congress’s authority to circumvent sovereign immunity. Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas involved a suit by the United States against a fuel plant to
recover money that the United States had paid to reimburse a
state government for expenses incurred in the cleanup of hazardous waste generated by the defendant’s facility.34 The fuel
company filed a third-party suit against the state, asserting
that the state was liable as an owner and operator of the contaminated site under CERCLA.35 A divided court rejected the
state’s motion for dismissal, and held that Congress may strip
the states of their Eleventh Amendment immunity through either Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment legislation.36
But this expansion of congressional power was short-lived.
The Court later overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,37 a case involving an Indian tribe suit against the State of
Florida under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.38 This Act allows Indian gaming activities to be conducted if performed pursuant to a valid compact between the tribe and the state in
which the gaming activities take place.39 Under the Act, the
states have a duty to negotiate such a compact with a tribe.40 If
a state fails to negotiate in good faith, a tribe may sue in federal court in order to compel state cooperation.41
The Seminole Tribe sought to compel negotiations under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,42 but Florida claimed that
the suit should be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 243.
See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996).
See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1989) (plurality opinion).
See id.
See id. at 23.
517 U.S. at 71-74.
See id. at 47-51.
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1994).
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7).
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51.
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grounds.43 The Supreme Court agreed with Florida, holding
that “the Eleventh Amendment prevent[s] Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States . . . to enforce
legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.”44
More importantly, the Court held that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate state immunity through any Commerce
Clause legislation—leaving the Fourteenth Amendment as the
only source of congressional abrogation power.45 In reaching
this conclusion, the Seminole Court noted that Article III—
which prohibits federal court suits by private citizens against
the states—is ordinarily the “exclusive catalog of permissible
federal-court jurisdiction.”46 Although the Fourteenth Amendment “operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state
and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment,” the Eleventh Amendment cannot be limited by
“antecedent provisions of the Constitution,” such as the Commerce Clause.47
5. The Fourteenth Amendment and further constriction of
congressional power to abrogate state immunity
In City of Boerne v. Flores,48 the Court further narrowed
congressional abrogation power by articulating a more restrictive interpretation of Congress’s authority to enact Fourteenth
Amendment legislation.49 The Fourteenth Amendment provides
in relevant part that no state shall “deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”50 The Amendment further states that “Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”51 City
of Boerne v. Flores arose when a Catholic parish sued the local
government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1997 (RFRA) after the City of Boerne denied the church a permit to build additional worship space.52 In Boerne, the Supreme
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id.
Id. at 53, 76.
See id.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 65-66.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See id. at 519-29.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id. § 5.
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
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Court addressed the issue of whether Congress had exceeded
the scope of its Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 enforcement
power in enacting the RFRA.53 The RFRA prohibited the government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless the government could show that the burden “(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest.”54
The Court held that the “compelling government interest” and
“least restrictive means” test was too restrictive of government
action and created substantive rights not recognized by the
Constitution.55 Congress has the power to enact remedial statutes in order to protect against Equal Protection Clause violations, but it does not have the power “to determine as a matter
of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within
the ambit” of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 The Supreme
Court considered the RFRA to be “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object” that it could not “be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”57 Therefore, the RFRA could not have been
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.58
The Boerne decision did not directly focus on Eleventh
Amendment issues. Nevertheless, the decision will likely have
a substantial impact on the future of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence because it limited the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment—the only source of congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.59
B. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
1. Purpose of the ADEA
In studies conducted during the 1960s, Congress found that
older workers were finding it increasingly difficult to retain
employment and regain employment after being terminated.60
53. See id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
55. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509.
56. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
57. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509.
58. See id. at 512-17.
59. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71-74 (1996).
60. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
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Congress also found that “the setting of arbitrary age limits . . .
[had] become a common practice.”61 The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act62 was enacted in 1967 “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age”
and “to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination” by employers.63
The ADEA prohibits employers from “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age[.]”64 The statute provides that a court may enforce
the Act by granting legal or equitable relief “as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including
without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under” the Act.65
2. ADEA claims against state employers
Originally, the ADEA’s definition of “employer” only included private entities, and specifically excluded state employers.66 The 1967 statute provided: “The term ‘employer’ means a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty-five or more employees . . . but such term does not include the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the
Government of the United States, or a State or political subdivision thereof.”67
In 1974, however, Congress amended the Act to eliminate
the language excluding states from ADEA suits, and to include
the states within the employer definition.68 Specifically, the Act
now provides that the class of employers against whom ADEA
actions may be brought includes, among others, “a State or po-

Stat. 602 (1967).
61. Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-30 (1994).
63. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(b), 81
Stat. 602 (1967).
64. 29 U.S.C § 623(a)(1).
65. Id. § 626(b).
66. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 11,
81 Stat. 602, 605 (1967).
67. Id.
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2).
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litical subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality
of a State.”69
Elsewhere in the statute, the ADEA explicitly grants jurisdiction over claims against employers who violate the Act.70
The Act provides, “Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter . . . .”71 Although this provision merely authorizes ADEA
suits in “any court of competent jurisdiction” and does not specifically authorize federal court jurisdiction, the ADEA otherwise incorporates by reference the procedural provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, which in turn specifically authorize
federal court jurisdiction.72
Despite the 1974 amendments, however, the federal circuits
are split as to whether the Act effectively abrogates the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Atascadero “unmistakably clear” standard.73 This dispute has most recently been
addressed by the Eighth Circuit in Humenansky v. Board of
Regents of the University of Minnesota.74
III. HUMENANSKY V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA
A. Facts
Humenansky involved an electron technician who was employed by the University of Minnesota for twenty-five years before being laid off.75 The former employee sued the university,
69. Id.
70. See § 626(c).
71. Id.
72. See § 626(b).
73. Compare Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1998), Keeton v. University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998), Hurd v. Pittsburg
State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1997), Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp.,
77 F.3d 690, 695 (3d Cir. 1996), Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional
Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1991), Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441,
443 (7th Cir. 1990), and Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 701 (1st Cir.
1983), with Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822,
824-25 (8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No.
98-1235), and Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999).
74. 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998).
75. See Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 958 F. Supp. 439,
440 (D. Minn. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No.
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alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the
ADEA.76
Upon the university’s motion for summary judgment, the
district court dismissed the plaintiff’s action in its entirety,
holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the employee’s
ADEA claims against the state employer.77 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss
the employee’s claims.78 The appellate court held that the
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity had not been abrogated
by the ADEA because Congress (1) failed to sufficiently express
its intent to abrogate state immunity with the ADEA, and (2)
did not enact the ADEA pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.79
B. The Humenansky Court’s Reasoning
1. Congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity with the ADEA
The Eighth Circuit held that Congress failed to adequately
manifest its intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment for
ADEA claims.80 In support of its conclusion, the court looked to
similar language from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
which had been held by the Supreme Court to be insufficient as
an expression of congressional intent to abrogate.81 Originally,
neither the FLSA nor the ADEA were intended to apply to
state employers.82 In 1966, however, Congress attempted to
provide for FLSA suits against the states by amending the
definition of “employer” to include certain state agencies.83 Despite the change, the Supreme Court held in Employees of the

98-1235).
76. See id.
77. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d 822, 824.
78. See id. at 824-28.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 825.
81. See id. at 824-25.
82. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602, 605 (1967); Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 282 (1973) (noting that under “§ 3(d) of
[FLSA], ‘employer’ was first defined to exclude the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State.”).
83. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 824-25.
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Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and Welfare that the Act did not sufficiently express
an intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity because
Congress failed to correspondingly amend the statute’s enforcement provision—the provision which authorizes suit
against violators of the act and designates the courts in which
an action may be brought.84 In other words, despite Congress’s
reference to the states as possible defendants, the Court refused to deprive the states of their immunity unless Congress
provided some other indication that their constitutional immunity was swept away.85
To overturn this decision, Congress amended the FLSA’s
enforcement provision to allow claims “against any employer
(including a public agency) in any Federal or State court.”86 A
number of courts have since held that the 1974 amendments
express an unmistakably clear intent to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity.87
At the same time Congress amended the FLSA enforcement
provision to permit suits in federal court against the states, it
amended the ADEA definition of “employer” to include “a State
or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State.”88 But Congress failed to simultaneously
amend the enforcement provision of the ADEA; the current
provision does not expressly provide for federal court suits
against the states.89 On the other hand, the ADEA does incorporate the current FLSA procedures by reference, including the
FLSA’s extremely clear authorization for federal court jurisdiction over state defendants.90 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that, because the ADEA still does not expressly authorize federal court suits in its own text, Congress has not
84. See id. at 285.
85. See id.
86. Amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88
Stat. 55, 58 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1966)).
87. See, e.g., Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1993); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1993).
88. Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 825
(8th Cir. 1998) (citing Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 74 (codified at 29 U.S.C.§
630(b)(2) (1994))), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 981235).
89. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994)).
90. At 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994), the ADEA incorporates, inter alia, 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) of the FLSA, which authorizes claims “against any employer (including a public
agency) in any Federal or State court.”
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clearly expressed its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity from ADEA suits.91
2. Congressional authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity
The Humenansky court also concluded that even if Congress intended to abrogate the states’ immunity to federal court
ADEA suits, it lacked the authority to do so.92 The overwhelming majority of courts disagree with the Eighth Circuit. They
argue that Congress has the power to deter Fourteenth
Amendment violations through legislation that prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional, so long as the remedy
is proportional to the injury Congress seeks to prevent.93 The
majority contends that the ADEA is a proportional remedy because the Act is “narrowly drawn to protect older citizens from
arbitrary and capricious action,”94 and, according to the ADEA’s
legislative history, age discrimination was prevalent at the
time of its enactment.95
The Humenansky court rejected this argument, concluding
that the ADEA does not constitute valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation.96 In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit noted several cases in which the Supreme Court refused to
extend Fourteenth Amendment protections against age discrimination as far as the ADEA does.97 In Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia,98 for example, the Supreme Court up-

91. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825.
92. See id. at 827.
93. See, e.g., Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 1998).
94. Id. at 503.
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)-(b) (1994).
96. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827.
97. The court explained:
Age is not a suspect class entitled to a heightened level of equal protection
scrutiny. . . . In Vance v. Bradley, . . . the Court upheld a federal statute
mandating that Foreign Service officers retire at age sixty against an equal
protection challenge, concluding the classification was valid under rational
basis review. The Equal Protection Clause applies not only to statutes such
as those at issue in Murgia and Vance, but also to the day-to-day employment
decisions of a myriad of state officers and agencies. But these isolated executive actions are unconstitutional only if they are the product of intentional
discrimination that “fail[s] to comport with the requirements of equal protection.”
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
98. 427 U.S. 307 (1979).
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held a police department’s mandatory retirement policy because it furthered the rational state objective of eliminating
physically unfit police officers.99 The Court held that age is not
a suspect class entitled to a heightened level of equal protection
scrutiny.100 Based on Murgia and similar cases, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that, “given the many economic and social factors
that may justify adverse employment action based upon age in
a particular situation, it seems likely that only a few isolated,
egregiously irrational instances of age discrimination would
violate the Equal Protection Clause.”101
In further support of its position, the Eighth Circuit cited
City of Boerne v. Flores,102 in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Congress exceeded the scope of its
Section 5 enforcement power in enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.103 As explained above, the Supreme Court held
that the “compelling government interest” and “least restrictive
means” tests of the RFRA were so restrictive of government action that the statute could not have been enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires only a rational basis
for government action.104
The Humenansky court concluded that because the ADEA,
like the RFRA, exceeds the scope of the Equal Protection
Clause, the Age Act does not fall within Congress’s authority to
prevent violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 Thus, the
Eighth Circuit held that the Act fails to meet the authority requirement for abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity.106
99. See id. at 317.
100. See id. at 313.
101. Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827 (footnote omitted).
102. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
103. See id. at 512-13.
104. See id. at 512-35.
105. See generally Humenansky, 152 F.3d 822. Note, however, that the ADEA has
been upheld as valid under the Commerce Clause. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S.
226, 243 (1983).
106. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827-28. The Eleventh Circuit is the only other
circuit to have held that the ADEA does not effectively abrogate the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. However, the court arrived at this conclusion with substantial
disagreement. Of the three judges, only one believed that Congress did not adequately
express an intent to abrogate immunity, and only one concluded that Congress did not
have the authority to abrogate immunity with the ADEA. The third judge argued that
Congress failed to meet either requirement. Although the court’s two-to-one vote in
favor of dismissing the plaintiff’s claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds carried the
day, the division within the Eleventh Circuit is representative of the discord among the
circuits regarding both the intent and authority issues.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HUMENANSKY COURT’S REASONING
A. Clarifying the “Unmistakably Clear” Requirement:
Expressing Congressional Intent to Abrogate State Immunity
Seven of the nine circuits to address the intent issue have
either held or stated in dicta that Congress adequately expressed its intent to abrogate the states’ immunity when it
amended the ADEA in 1974.107 The Humenansky court’s disagreement with the majority essentially hinges on its interpretation of the “unmistakably clear” standard set forth in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.108
By definition, unmistakable language is that “not capable of
being . . . misunderstood.”109 Similarly, the word “clear” has
been defined as “free from obscurity or ambiguity: easily understood: . . . free from doubt.”110 Each word, taken alone, demands an extremely high level of explicitness. When construed
together, however, the words “intensif[y] the implications” of
each other, creating an even more demanding standard of clarity.111 The level of clarity required under Atascadero is magnified even further when the phrase “unmistakably clear” is combined with another intent requirement: that the unequivocal
language be contained within the text of the statute itself.112
For the purposes of this Note, the combination of these two
elements will be referred to as the “Atascadero standard” or the
“unmistakably clear requirement.”

107. Compare Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1998), Keeton v. University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998), Hurd v. Pittsburg
State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1997), Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp.,
77 F.3d 690, 695 (3d Cir. 1996), Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional
Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1991), Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441,
443 (7th Cir. 1990), and Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 701 (1st Cir.
1983), with Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822,
824-25 (8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No.
98-1235), and Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999).
108. 473 U.S. 234, 238, 243 (1985).
109. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1294 (10th ed. 1997).
110. Id. at 213.
111. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1430 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999).
112. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989).
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1. A framework for analyzing congressional intent
The Supreme Court has suggested that legislative history is
largely irrelevant in determining congressional intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.113 Thus, the Atascadero standard goes more to the structure of statutory language than to
the Court’s desire to understand Congress’s intent.114 Conceivably, Congress could produce volumes of legislative history
regarding its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity through a piece of legislation. But if the text of the statute
lacked one or more of a few key phrases, the Supreme Court
would be unlikely to find the statute abrogates sovereign immunity. A court may be thoroughly convinced that Congress intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity and yet
conclude that Congress did not express its intent with enough
force.
The circuit courts’ treatment of the ADEA provides substantial evidence that the courts interpret Atascadero as placing heavy emphasis on the form of would-be abrogation language. In Kimel v. State of Florida Board of Regents,115 for
example, Judge Edmondson stated,
I do not dispute that some provisions of the ADEA make
States look like possible defendants in suits alleging violations of the ADEA. I accept that these provisions could support an “inference that the States were intended to be subject
to damages actions for violations of the [ADEA]” [b]ut . . . a
permissible inference is not “the unequivocal declaration” that
is required to show Congress’s intent to exercise its powers of
abrogation.116

This language suggests that the court indeed may not have
been as uncertain about Congress’s intent, as much as it was
uncertain about whether Congress expressed its intent with
sufficient explicitness. Given a less stringent standard than
the “unmistakably clear” requirement, perhaps Edmondson
and other judges adopting the minority position would have
readily adopted the inference that the states were intended to
113. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996) (holding that Congress
may only abrogate state sovereign immunity “by making its intention unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute”) (citation omitted).
114. See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 228.
115. 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998).
116. Id. at 1432 (citations omitted).
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be subject to ADEA suits in federal court. Under the Atascadero standard, however, Edmondson was only willing to concede that the provisions of the ADEA “could” support this inference.117 Because of this reasoning, the courts are still divided
as to whether the ADEA meets the Atascadero intent requirements, even though Congress amended the ADEA to explicitly
include the states within the class of potential defendantemployers, and deleted all provisions which previously excluded states from the class of defendants.118
The question of whether the Humenansky court correctly
applied the Atascadero standard can be most easily addressed
by analyzing the ADEA in light of a few specific types of statutory provisions that have been held to constitute language sufficient to express intent. Specifically, the case law suggests
that, for a statute to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, the
text of the statute generally must either (1) make direct reference to the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity, or (2)
specifically refer to the states as defendants within the section
of the statute that defines the class of potential defendants.119
If option two is invoked and there is still substantial ambiguity
as to congressional intent, the courts may also require the text
to authorize actions against a state within the statute’s enforcement provision—the portion of the statute that authorizes
suits by aggrieved persons and designates the courts in which
these suits may be brought.120

117. See id.
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1994).
119. See infra Part IV.A.3. See also, e.g., Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 231. In Dellmuth,
despite the fact that the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) contained frequent
references to state obligations under the Act, the Court stated:
We cannot agree that the textual provisions on which the Court of Appeals
relied, or any other provisions of the EHA, demonstrate with unmistakable
clarity that Congress intended to abrogate the States’ immunity from suit.
The EHA makes no reference whatsoever to either the Eleventh Amendment
or the States’ sovereign immunity. Nor does any provision cited by the Court
of Appeals address abrogation in even oblique terms, much less with the clarity Atascadero requires.
Id. (citation omitted).
120. In Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department
of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), for example, the Court recognized
that the states were included within the FLSA’s class of defendants. But other language provided that a federal officer may sue the state on behalf of aggrieved individuals. The court reasoned that Congress might have included the states as defendants
only so that they could be sued by the federal officer. Such an authorization for suit
against the states would not require abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment because
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2. Using “magic words” to express congressional intent
Although use of the word “immunity” or the phrase “Eleventh Amendment” would provide the clearest textual indication
of congressional intent to contravene state immunity, Congress
is not required to use any certain “magic words.”121 By holding
Congress to the Atascadero standard, the Supreme Court has
come close to requiring specific immunity-abrogating language.
In fact, the Court stated in Dellmuth v. Muth122 that anything

federal court suits against the state by the federal government are not prohibited by
the amendment. See id. at 285.
On the other hand, the possibility that a private citizen could sue a state defendant in state court has not appeared to generate as much concern for the Supreme
Court regarding the meaning of statutory language that includes the states within a
class of defendants. Federal law claims can generally be brought in either federal or
state court. Since the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit state court suits against
the states, the Supreme Court could arguably find ambiguity as to congressional intent
to abrogate sovereign immunity whenever a statute refers to the states as defendants
but does not expressly refer to sovereign immunity or the Eleventh Amendment. Authorizing suits by private citizens against states would not require abrogation of the
Eleventh Amendment because individuals could still sue a state in state court. Thus,
the states-as-defendants language would not be rendered meaningless whether or not
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment was intended.
121. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 n.15 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999). In concluding that the ADEA fails to adequately
express congressional intent to abrogate immunity, Judge Edmonson stated in a footnote,
I do not say that certain magic words must be used to abrogate immunity. I
accept that Congress could unmistakably signal abrogation of immunity in a
variety of ways, and we write no general rules today. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1) (where Title VII speaks of suits by aggrieved persons against “a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision” while discussing
suits in federal district courts).
Id. But compare Judge Hatchett’s dissenting opinion:
Although Judge Edmondson states that we do not require Congress to
use any “magic words” to abrogate effectively the states’ sovereign immunity,
and that Congress may “unmistakably signal abrogation of immunity in a variety of ways,” I believe that his opinion, in essence, is requiring exactly that.
If Congress has not sufficiently expressed its intent to abrogate the states’
immunity through including “States” in the definition of “employer” in the
ADEA, after this decision, I cannot imagine in what other “variety of ways”
Congress can signal the abrogation of the states’ immunity, other than
through the use of “magic words.” The Court in Seminole Tribe did not require that Congress use any talismanic language to express its intent to abrogate, and could easily have done so. As I do not believe that Seminole Tribe
requires Congress to use any particular words to express effectively its intent
to abrogate the states’ immunity, and because I believe that Congress’s intent
is clear in the language of the ADEA, I conclude that the first criterion of
Seminole Tribe is satisfied.
122. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
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short of “perfect confidence that Congress in fact intended to
abrogate sovereign immunity . . . will not suffice . . . .”123 However, by not requiring an explicit reference to the “Eleventh
Amendment” or “sovereign immunity,” the Supreme Court actually stops short of requiring “perfect” clarity, as evidenced by
the fact that that there is almost always substantial confusion
regarding congressional intent whenever a statute does not
employ these key words.124
3. Comparison of the ADEA with other statutes’ intent language
By examining the language from statutes that have already
been held to either lack or possess a sufficient manifestation of
congressional intent to abrogate immunity, the following section will attempt to alleviate some of this confusion by articulating the requirements of the “unmistakably clear” rule. This
section will also demonstrate that the Humenansky court erred
in concluding that the ADEA lacks sufficient manifestation of
congressional intent to abrogate state immunity.
a. Statutes that clearly do not express congressional intent
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
(1) The Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act
provides a remedy for federal employees who allege
employment discrimination on the basis of their disabilities.125
The statute provides in part that,
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

123. Id. at 231.
124. See infra Part IV.A.3. See also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), in
which four justices dissented from the majority’s conclusion that the Education of the
Handicapped Act did not abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, where the
EHA was replete with references to the states and their obligations to aggrieved parties, but made no direct reference to Eleventh Amendment immunity or federal court
jurisdiction. Also note that, in Kimel, the Eleventh Circuit held that the ADEA does
not effectively abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. But only one judge
concluded that Congress failed to adequately express an intent to abrogate immunity,
and only one concluded that Congress did not have the authority to abrogate immunity
with the ADEA, while the third member of the panel argued that Congress failed to
meet either requirement. See 139 F.3d 1426, 1433, 1444, 1449.
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
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participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service.126

Before 1986, the Rehabilitation Act provided for remedies
against “any recipient of Federal assistance.”127 In Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, the plaintiff argued that the word
“any” made this provision broad enough to include state “recipients.”128 Therefore, the plaintiff reasoned, the states were
not immune to claims arising under this Act.129 The Supreme
Court expressly rejected this argument, holding that a “general
authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.”130 In other words, even if the language of a
statute allows or seems to require jurisdiction, the statute will
not effectively abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity absent
a more deliberate expression of congressional intent to do so.131
(2) Other “general authorization” statutes. Welch v.
Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation132
involved a state employee who was injured while working on a
ferry dock owned by the Texas transportation department.133
The employee sued the state pursuant to the Jones Act, which
provides, “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment may . . . maintain an action for damages” in federal court.134 Addressing the state’s assertion of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Supreme Court applied
the Atascadero standard and held that Congress had not unequivocally expressed its intention to contravene the Eleventh
Amendment in unmistakably clear language within the Jones
Act.135 In the plurality opinion, Justice Powell reiterated that a
“general authorization for suit in federal court” does not consti-

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1973) (amended 1986).
See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245 (1985).
See id.
Id. at 246.
See id.
483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 470-71.
46 U.S.C. § 688 (a) (1994).
See Welch, 483 U.S. at 475.
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tute adequate abrogation language.136
Similarly, the word “whoever” in a patent statute and the
word “anyone” in a copyright statute have been held to be insufficient designations of the states as potential defendants for
purposes of abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity.137 The
federal patent statute reads in pertinent part: “[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, or offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”138 The copyright statute provides, “Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright.”139 In
each case, the circuit courts found the statutory language to
contain nothing more than a general authorization for suit in
federal court. For example, in Chew v. California, the court did
not find “the requisite unmistakable language of congressional
intent necessary to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.”140
The patent and copyright statutes, the pre-1986 Rehabilitation Act, and the Jones Act are clear examples of legislation
that fails to meet the Atascadero standard. Comparing the
ADEA with these statutes sheds little light on the Humenansky
holding because the language of the ADEA is much more explicit in designating states as potential defendants. Nevertheless, these “general authorization” statutes illustrate one extreme of the clarity spectrum.
b. Statutes that clearly express congressional intent to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
(1) The Americans with Disabilities Act. Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in part because it found that discrimination against individuals with disabilities had become a pervasive problem in the United States,
and that, “unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or
age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the
basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress

136. Id. at 476 (citation omitted).
137. See BV Eng’g v. U.C.L.A., 858 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1988).
138. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
140. Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 334 (Fed. Cir. 1990), superceded by statute
as stated in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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such discrimination.”141 The ADA provides remedies for individuals discriminated against in employment and other situations because of their disabilities.142
Whereas the general authorization statutes described above
are clearly inadequate expressions of intent under the Atascadero standard, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is
blatantly clear in expressing intent, and falls on the other end
of the spectrum. The ADA reads, “A State shall not be immune
under the Eleventh Amendment . . . from suit in Federal court
for a violation” of the ADA.143
(2) The amended Rehabilitation Act. The present version
of the Rehabilitation Act is equally explicit. In response to the
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Atascadero that the statute did
not contain an unequivocal expression of congressional intent
to abrogate state immunity,144 Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act to include abrogation language similar to that of the
ADA. The amended statute provides, “[A] State shall not be
immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of
the United States . . . for a violation of [the Rehabilitation
Act].”145
The explicit abrogation language of the ADA and the
amended Rehabilitation Act is arguably the only type of language that would measure up to the Atascadero standard in all
cases. Although the Supreme Court has never specifically required the use of precise language to abrogate immunity, perhaps it should. Given the Supreme Court’s insistence that abrogation language be expressed with such extreme clarity, it
would be better to take this final step and require a direct reference to sovereign immunity or the Eleventh Amendment as a
sort of ritualistic signal of congressional intent to abrogate
state immunity. By not taking this final step, and yet requiring
unmistakable language of intent within a statute’s text, the
Supreme Court leaves room for confusion where a statute’s expression of congressional intent lies somewhere between the
perfect clarity of the ADA and the clearly inadequate general
authorizations for suit provided by statutes like the Jones Act.
Because the ADEA’s abrogation language falls somewhere in
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (1994).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985).
42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994).
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this gray area, a comparison of the ADEA with other statutes
lacking explicit references to the Eleventh Amendment provides insight into the issue of whether the Age Act complies
with the unmistakably clear rule.
c. Statutes in the gray area of congressional expression of
intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
(1) The Education of the Handicapped Act. The Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) enacts a system of providing handicapped children with free public education appropriate for their individual needs.146 The statute provides access to
the courts through a cause of action for parties aggrieved by
the administrative proceedings at which decisions regarding
the allocation of EHA funds are made.147 Although the EHA allows for judicial review on behalf of these “aggrieved parties,” it
lacks any direct reference to sovereign immunity or the Eleventh Amendment. Unlike the “general authorization” statutes,
however, the EHA contains frequent references to the states,
and outlines the states’ and local authorities’ roles in providing
education for handicapped children.148 Nevertheless, in Dellmuth v. Muth, a sharply divided Supreme Court found the
EHA to lack a sufficient expression of intent.149 The Court
stated,
We recognize that the EHA’s frequent reference to the States,
and its delineation of the States’ important role in securing an
appropriate education for handicapped children, make the
States, along with local agencies, logical defendants in suits
alleging violations of the EHA. This statutory structure lends
force to the inference that the States were intended to be subject to damages actions for violations of the EHA. But such a
permissible inference, whatever its logical force, would remain just that: a permissible inference. It would not be the
unequivocal declaration which, we reaffirm today, is necessary before we will determine that Congress intended to exercise its powers of abrogation.150

Thus, we learn from Dellmuth that statutes without specific

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 225 (1989).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) and (4)(1994).
See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 232.
See id. at 232.
Id.
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reference to sovereign immunity must not only refer to the
states, but must refer to the states in the right place. At least
according to the Dellmuth majority, the statute must “speak to
what parties are subject to suit” in the narrow portion of the
text which defines these parties, regardless of the number of
references to, or obligations imposed on, a state in other portions of the statute.151 On the other hand, the fact that four justices found ample evidence of intent within the EHA suggests
that this requirement should be taken with a grain of salt.
The ADEA’s intent language is superior to the EHA’s because the ADEA refers to the states in the section that defines
the class of potential defendants in age discrimination cases.152
Specifically, the statute defines “employer” to include “a State
or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State.”153
But the existence of such language is not necessarily dispositive. If a federal statute prohibits state court jurisdiction, but
includes the states within the defendant class, the states-asdefendants language is likely to be viewed as substantial evidence of congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity.
Otherwise, the inclusion of states as defendants would be rendered meaningless. In most federal statutes, however, Congress authorizes concurrent jurisdiction. As to these statutes,
the fact that a state may be sued under the statute does not
necessarily suggest that Congress intended to abrogate sovereign immunity because the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit private suits against a state in state court.
Nevertheless, the existence or absence of references to the
states as potential defendants is a substantial factor in the
courts’ analysis of congressional intent, regardless of whether
the statute at issue authorizes suit in both state and federal
court.
(2) CERCLA. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA” or “ Superfund Act”) imposes liability on those who are responsible for
generating hazardous waste.154 The Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (SARA) amends and clarifies

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994).
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CERCLA.155 On the same day that the Supreme Court decided
Dellmuth, the Court found CERCLA, as amended by SARA, to
contain sufficient language of intent because this act, unlike
the EHA, does refer to the states within the portion of text that
defines potential defendants.156
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether CERCLA, as amended by SARA,
“permits a suit for monetary damages against a State in federal
court and, if so, whether Congress has the authority to create
such a cause of action when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause.”157 The Court answered both questions affirmatively.158 Although the Court’s holding as to the authority issue
was later overruled in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,159 its analysis
of the intent issue is still relevant for the purpose of interpreting the “unmistakably clear” rule.
“Persons” and “owners or operators” are listed among those
who may be liable under CERCLA.160 The definition of “persons” specifically includes the “States.” SARA excludes states
that have “acquired ownership or control involuntarily” from
the definition of “owners or operators.”161 The Act specifies,
however, that this exclusion
shall not apply to any State or local government which has
caused or contributed to the release . . . of a hazardous substance . . . , and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and
to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as
any nongovernmental entity.162

The Union Gas Court held that these provisions conveyed congressional intent to abrogate state immunity with unmistakable clarity, because, unlike the EHA, CERCLA and SARA not
only impose obligations on the states, they also refer to the
states in the section which defines the potential defendants.163

155. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
156. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
157. Id. at 5.
158. See id.
159. 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
161. Id. § 9601(20)(D).
162. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 8 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D)).
163. See id. The Court stated, “[t]he express inclusion of States within the stat-
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(3) The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In another case,
however, the Supreme Court found the abrogation language of
the FLSA (which regulates wages, hours, and other employment-related concerns)164 to be insufficient,165 despite the fact
that Congress amended the original definition of “employer” to
include state and local agencies.
In Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, the Court invalidated Congress’s attempt to abrogate sovereign immunity
with its 1966 amendments to the FLSA because Congress
failed to also amend the statute’s enforcement provision to provide for federal court actions against the states.166 Although
states were specifically included within the class of potential
defendants, the statute’s enforcement clause provided only
generally for private suits by the “employee” against the “employer” to recover unpaid compensation “in any court of competent jurisdiction.”167 The Court stated it would “be surprising . .
. to infer that Congress deprived Missouri of her constitutional
immunity without changing the [enforcement provision] under
which she could not be sued or indicating in some way by clear
language that the constitutional immunity was swept away.”168
To overturn the ruling, Congress amended the enforcement
provision again in 1974 to authorize private suits “against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
court.”169 A number of circuits have since held that the 1974
amendments reflect an unmistakably clear intent to abrogate
sovereign immunity.170
(4) Comparison of the ADEA with the FLSA. The ADEA’s
enforcement provision fails to specifically authorize federal
court suits against the states. The amendments to the ADEA

ute’s definition of ‘persons,’ and the plain statement that States are to be considered
‘owners or operators’. . . together convey a message of unmistakable clarity: Congress
intended that States be liable along with everyone else for cleanup costs recoverable
under CERCLA.” Id.
164. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994).
165. See Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973).
166. See id. at 283-85.
167. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 4, 7,
81 Stat. 602 (1967).
168. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994).
170. See, e.g., Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1993).
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parallel those of the FLSA. Both the ADEA and the FLSA were
originally intended to exclude states from their definitions of
defendant-employers, and Congress subsequently amended
both statutes to include states within these definitions.171 A
major difference, however, is that the FLSA’s enforcement provision was amended to permit suits “against any employer (including a public agency) in any federal or State court,”172 and
the ADEA’s enforcement provision, to this day, provides only a
general authorization for ADEA suits: “Any person aggrieved
may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction . . . .”173
Under Employees, Congress’s failure to amend the ADEA’s
enforcement provision could arguably compel a finding that the
language was insufficient as a manifestation of intent to abrogate. The Humenansky court reasoned, “[i]f Congress intended
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for the ADEA as
well as the FLSA, and recognized that Employees required that
intent to abrogate be reflected by amending the enforcement
provisions, . . . [Congress would have amended] the ADEA provision that most directly addresses the question of federal court
jurisdiction.”174
(a) ADEA and FLSA enforcement provision. The
ADEA incorporates the FLSA’s enforcement provision, which
authorizes federal court jurisdiction against state employers.
However, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) provides that the ADEA “shall be
enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in” the FLSA.175 The FLSA’s 1974 enforcement
provision, which specifically allows suits by private parties
against public agencies in federal court, is one of the sections
that is cross-referenced in the ADEA.176 Therefore, because
Congress corrected the deficient language of the FLSA, and because the corrected language of the FLSA is incorporated by
reference in the Age Act, the ADEA’s immunity-abrogating
language was corrected by proxy.
171. See Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822,
824-25 (8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No.
98-1235).
172. Amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88
Stat. 55, 61 (1974).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1994).
174. Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825.
175. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
176. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825.
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Admittedly, the Supreme Court held in Atascadero that the
intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment must be expressed within the unmistakable language of the statute itself.177 In light of this requirement, the Humenansky court concluded that the ADEA’s incorporation of the FLSA’s immunityabrogating language is insufficient. The court held that the
ADEA still lacks sufficient language of intent because it contains no unmistakably clear expression of intent within its own
text.178
However, by ignoring the cross-referenced FLSA provisions
in its analysis of the ADEA’s abrogation language, the Eighth
Circuit takes the Atascadero standard too far. In Union Gas,
the Supreme Court clearly considered the language of
CERCLA’s
companion
statute—SARA—in
determining
whether CERCLA abrogated the Eleventh Amendment.179 Recall that SARA, which supplements CERCLA, provides that a
“State or local government which has caused or contributed to
the release . . . of a hazardous substance . . . , and such a State
or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively as any nongovernmental entity.”180
If the statute had not contained this language, the Court would
not likely have held that CERCLA abrogates the Eleventh
Amendment.
The relationship between CERCLA and SARA is similar to
that of the ADEA and the FLSA. The provisions of the FLSA
are intended to supplement and clarify the ADEA. The ADEA
incorporates, inter alia, the FLSA provision,181 which authorizes claims “against any employer (including a public agency)
in any Federal or State court.”182 Under the approach in Union
Gas, this language should not be ignored. Although Atascadero
requires Congress to manifest its intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment with language within the statute itself,183
Union Gas suggests that language within statutes that are intertwined with the original statute may also be considered for
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825.
See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) & (35)(D) (1994).
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Id.
See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
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the purpose of analyzing congressional intent. Because the
Humenansky court discounted the relevance of the incorporation of the FLSA provision in its analysis of the ADEA’s intent
language, it wrongly concluded that the Age Act fails to meet
the intent requirement for abrogating the Eleventh Amendment.
(b) The ADEA as distinguishable from the pre-1974
FLSA. As noted, the pre-1974, pre-Employees FLSA specifically included the states within its definition of potentially liable employers.184 But the Supreme Court concluded that this
provision was not a clear enough expression of congressional
intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.185
The Court’s uncertainty regarding Congress’s intent was
largely based on the fact that other language in the statute allowed for the possibility that the Eleventh Amendment could
remain in full force even if a state was sued in federal court
under the FLSA.186 The Court reasoned: if Congress did not intend to allow private individuals to sue state employers for
FLSA violations, but instead intended to allow a federal officer
to sue violating states in behalf of private individuals, the
Eleventh Amendment would not necessarily be compromised
by the statute.187 Thus, Congress’s intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment could not be ascertained simply because it
provided for suits against state employers in the 1966 version
of the FLSA.188 The Court argued,
By holding that Congress did not lift the sovereign immunity
of the States under the FLSA, we do not make the extension
of coverage to state employees meaningless. Section 16(c)
gives the Secretary of Labor authority to bring suit for unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under the
FLSA. Once the Secretary acts under § 16(c), the right of any
employee . . . to sue under § 16(b) terminates. Section 17 gives
the Secretary power to seek to enjoin violations of the Act and
to obtain restitution in behalf of employees. Sections 16 and
17 suggest that since private enforcement of the Act was not a
paramount objective, disallowance of suits by state employees
184. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 4,
7, 81 Stat. 602, 603-05 (1967).
185. See Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973).
186. See id. at 285-86.
187. See id.
188. See id.
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and remitting them to relief through the Secretary of Labor
may explain why Congress was silent as to waiver of sovereign immunity of the States. For suits by the United States
against a State are not barred by the Constitution.189

The ADEA is distinguishable from the FLSA because the
ADEA contains no such provisions within its own text. Nor is
there any other ambiguous language in the ADEA which suggests that Congress included the states within the “employer”
definition for any reason other than to abrogate the states sovereign immunity.
Although the Supreme Court suggested in Employees that
the intent language of the 1966 FLSA was inadequate because
it failed to refer to the states in the enforcement provision, the
Court also insinuated that explicit enforcement provision language was not necessarily a prerequisite to Eleventh Amendment abrogation.190 The Court stated that it would not deprive
the states of their immunity unless Congress changed the enforcement provision and “indicat[ed] in some way by clear language that the constitutional immunity was swept away.”191
Thus, the Court left the door open to the possibility that congressional intent could be expressed clearly through other
means, and stopped short of requiring a reference to the states
in the enforcement provision.
Indeed, if the procedures relating to the Secretary’s power
to intervene for private employees had not existed in the FLSA,
the Court would have been less likely to find the statute ambiguous as to Congress’s intent to abrogate immunity—
especially in light of the fact that the 1966 FLSA clearly identified the states as potentially liable employers.192 Thus, because
the text of the ADEA does not contain the Secretary of Labor
intervention provisions that gave rise to the Court’s uncer-

189. Id. (citations omitted).
190. See id. at 285.
191. Id. Note that the Court briefly acknowledged that even without the Secretary intervention procedures, the states-as-defendants provision would not necessarily
have become obsolete absent Eleventh Amendment abrogation. Justice Douglas stated,
The argument is that if we deny this direct federal court remedy, we in effect
are recognizing that there is a right without any remedy. Section 16(b), however, authorizes employee suits in “any court of competent jurisdiction.” Arguably, that permits suit in the [state] courts but that is a question we need
not reach.
Id. at 287.
192. See id. at 285-86.
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tainty in the first place, the holding in Employees cannot easily
be used to prove that the Supreme Court would find the
ADEA’s intent language inadequate. The intent language of
the ADEA is simply not as ambiguous as that of the 1966
FLSA.
(c) The ADEA adopts the Secretary of Labor provisions
and FLSA enforcement provisions by reference. The ADEA
adopts the FLSA’s Secretary of Labor procedures by reference.
But it does so in the same provision that incorporates the
FLSA’s amended enforcement provision—the very provision
which cured the prior ambiguity caused by the Secretary of Labor procedures.193 It would be incongruous to ignore the
ADEA’s reference to the FLSA enforcement provision for the
purpose of showing that the Age Act lacks textual clarity, while
simultaneously emphasizing other cross-referenced procedures
in order to show that the ambiguity regarding the pre-amended
FLSA also exists in the ADEA.
4. Final analysis of the ADEA’s compliance with the intent
requirement
Except as to statutes that specifically use the phrases
“Eleventh Amendment” or “sovereign immunity,” to abrogate
state immunity, there has been much disagreement among the
federal circuits and Supreme Court justices regarding the types
of provisions that do and do not constitute unmistakably clear
expressions of congressional intent to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment.194 Examination of Supreme Court cases that address the sufficiency of various would-be abrogation provisions
provides the clearest available picture of the types of provisions
that meet the Atascadero standard.
To contravene state immunity, a statute must contain more
than a general authorization for suit against a class of unspecified defendants.195 Furthermore, if the abrogation language
does not explicitly mention the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity, it must usually refer to the states specifically in
the portion of the statute which defines the class of potential
193. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
194. See supra Part IV.A. Also compare, for example, the conflicting opinions of
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 231 (1989), and Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139
F.3d 1426, 1429 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999).
195. See supra Part IV.A.3.a; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 246 (1985).
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defendants.196 But even where states were included within the
defendant class, the Supreme Court, in one case, required further reference to the states within the statute’s enforcement
provisions.197 However, this additional hurdle is likely to only
be imposed where the statute creates substantial ambiguity regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity even in light of references to the states as defendants.198
The Atascadero standard, in itself, establishes a highly demanding standard of congressional expression, but the Humenansky court applied the Atascadero standard to the ADEA
even more stringently than the test has been applied in any
Supreme Court decision. Although the ADEA falls short of explicitly stating that the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
is abrogated, it contains an unequivocal expression of Congress’s intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. By expressly including the states within the class of potential ADEA
defendants, Congress “could not have made its desire to override the states’ sovereign immunity [any] clearer.”199 Because
the ADEA (1) already has a textual expression of its intent to
subject the states to private suits, (2) contains no language contradictory to this expression of intent, and (3) incorporates the
FLSA procedures which specifically provide for suits against
public employers in federal court, the Humenansky court erred
in demanding that the ADEA’s abrogation language possess a

196. See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 232.
197. See Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 283-85 (1973).
198. See id. In Employees, the court held that the 1966 FLSA contained no sufficient manifestation of intent to abrogate. The court reasoned that “disallowance of
suits by state employees and remitting them to relief through the Secretary of Labor
may explain why Congress was silent as to waiver of sovereign immunity of the States.
For suits by the United States against a State are not barred by the Constitution.” Id.
at 286.
The Court’s uncertainty as to congressional intent did not seem to arise from
the fact that federal claims can be brought in state court. Since federal law claims can
generally be brought in either federal or state court, and since the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suits against the states in state court, the Supreme Court could
conceivably find ambiguity in the abrogation language of most statutes that refer to
state defendants but do not expressly refer to sovereign immunity or the Eleventh
Amendment. Authorizing suits by private citizens against the states would not require
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment because individuals could still sue a state in
state court. Thus, the states-as-defendants language would not be rendered meaningless in the absence of Eleventh Amendment abrogation.
199. Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1435 (quoting Davidson v. Board of Governors of State
Colleges & Univ. for W. Ill. Univ., 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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textual (rather than cross-referenced) enforcement provision
that authorizes suits in federal court against the states.
B. Questioning Congressional Authority to Abrogate Eleventh
Amendment Immunity
The Humenansky court also incorrectly concluded that the
ADEA fails to meet the authority prong of Eleventh Amendment abrogation. To strip the states of their sovereign immunity to federal court suits, Congress must manifest an unmistakably clear intent to do so, and enact the relevant legislation
pursuant to the proper authority—Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.200 If faced with the authority issue, the Supreme
Court should reject the Humenansky court’s conclusion that the
ADEA was not enacted under a proper exercise of Fourteenth
Amendment authority.
1. Testing the validity of Fourteenth Amendment legislation
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,201 the Supreme Court reiterated
the three-part test for determining whether Congress appropriately enacted certain legislation under its Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 5 enforcement power. First, a court must
determine whether a statute “may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.”202 Second, a court
must determine whether the statute “is plainly adapted” to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.203 Third, a court must determine whether the statute is consistent with, and “not prohibited by . . . ‘the letter and spirit of the Constitution.’ ”204
“Recently, the Supreme Court supplemented the [Katzenbach] analysis by directing courts to examine whether the statute creates new constitutional rights through legislation or
only deters and remedies constitutional violations.”205 In
Boerne, the Supreme Court applied this expanded test in its

200. See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
201. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
202. Id. at 651.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 830
(8th Cir. 1998) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)), petition for
cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 98-1235).

HUN-FIN.DOC

1072

4/10/00 1:15 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1999

analysis of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.206 The
RFRA prohibited government interference with an individual’s
exercise of religion unless the interference was in “furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest, and [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest.”207 The Supreme
Court held that, by enacting the RFRA, Congress created substantive Constitutional law, thereby exceeding its Section 5
power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.208 The Court emphasized the fact that Section 5 does not
give Congress authority to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.209
2. Limits to congressional power to create rights beyond
constitutionally-created rights
As the Humenansky court acknowledged, the Section 5 enforcement power does include the authority to create some
rights that exceed constitutionally-guaranteed rights.210 For
example, in order to combat racial discrimination in voting, the
Supreme Court sustained provisions of the Voting Rights Act
which prohibited literacy tests from being administered as a
prerequisite to voting rights.211 However, while sustaining
these provisions “despite the facial constitutionality of the
tests,” the Court explained that such extensions of rights cannot be out of proportion to their purported remedial or preventative objective.212
In contrast to its decision regarding the Voting Rights Act,
the United States Supreme Court held in Boerne that the
RFRA, with its “compelling government interest” and “least restrictive means” requirements, was out of proportion to Congress’s object of prohibiting religious discrimination.213 The Supreme Court also held that the RFRA contradicted principles of
federal-state separation and balance of powers by prohibiting
state laws that place incidental burdens on religion that are

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1997).
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-37.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 518.
Id. at 532-37.
See id.
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not animus or hostility based.214
Applying Boerne, the Humenansky court concluded that the
ADEA does not constitute valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation.215 The court argued that age is not a protected class that
rises to the level of judicially-recognized classes, and that, by
restricting nearly all age-discrimination, the ADEA exceeds the
protections offered by the Fourteenth Amendment.216
3. The constitutionality of age discrimination
The Humenansky court noted the Supreme Court has upheld employment policies that set mandatory retirement
ages,217 and that Congress itself has enacted mandatory retirement legislation which would arguably violate its own Age
Discrimination Act.218 Employment decisions, the Eighth Circuit argued, are only unconstitutional if they are the product of
intentional discrimination that fails to comport with the requirements of equal protection.219 Employment actions motivated by a rational purpose do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.220 Judge Loken noted, “[G]iven the many economic and
social factors that may justify adverse employment action
based upon age . . . , it seems likely that only a few isolated,
egregiously irrational instances of age discrimination would
violate the Equal Protection Clause.”221
Supreme Court dictum addressing this issue lends some
support to the Eighth Circuit’s position. In EEOC v. Wyoming,222 four dissenting justices concluded that the ADEA could
not have been enacted under Congress’s Section 5 authority.223
214. See id.
215. See Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 826
(8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 981235).
216. See id. at 826-28.
217. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15
(1976) (upholding mandatory retirement age for state police officers).
218. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262-63 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting “the power of Congress to impose the Age Act on the states when Congress, in the same year that the Age Act was extended to the states, passed mandatory
retirement legislation . . . for law enforcement officers and firefighters”) (citations omitted).
219. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827.
220. See id.
221. Id. (footnote omitted).
222. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
223. See id. at 263.
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Burger argued,
There is no hint in the . . . Constitution . . . that every classification based on age is outlawed. Yet there is much in the
Constitution and the relevant Amendments to indicate that
states retain sovereign powers not expressly surrendered, and
these surely include the power to choose the employees they
feel are best able to serve . . . .
And even were we to assume, arguendo, that Congress could
redefine the Fourteenth Amendment, I would still reject the
power of Congress to impose the Age Act on the states when
Congress, in the same year that the Age Act was extended to
the states, passed mandatory retirement legislation of its
own . . . for law enforcement officers and firefighters.224

The overwhelming majority of federal circuit courts, however, have rejected these arguments, holding that the ADEA is
valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation.
4. Is the ADEA “plainly adapted” to enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause?
Congress’ power to legislate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to legislation that protects
suspect classifications such as race or gender,225 and the structure of the ADEA and its legislative history provides substantial evidence that the ADEA was intended to prevent Equal
Protection Clause violations.226 Congress stated in the preamble to the ADEA:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older
workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts
to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs; the setting of arbitrary
age limits regardless of potential for job performance
has become a common practice, and certain otherwise
desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of
older persons; . . . .
....

224. Id. (citations omitted).
225. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1437 (11th Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999).
226. See, e.g., Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 1998).
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It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination
in employment; to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age
on employment.227
In addition, the legislative history of the 1974 Amendment
provides evidence that “Congress subsequently established that
these same conditions existed in the public sector.”228 As Judge
Bataillon reasoned in the Humenansky dissent,
[T]he text of the ADEA . . . directly addresse[s] the arbitrary
discrimination older employees face in the workplace. . . .
[T]he documented existence of age-based discrimination in
private and public employment induced Congress to intrude
not only upon the interests of private employers but also upon
state interests through the enactment of the 1974 amendments. In light of the well-documented need for equal protection of older workers, I believe the ADEA is plainly adapted to
the end of providing older workers equal protection under the
law.229

Furthermore, Boerne does not invalidate the ADEA as
Fourteenth Amendment legislation because, unlike the RFRA’s
limitations on governments, the restrictions imposed by the
ADEA are proportional to the injuries Congress sought to prevent.230 The Act is intended “to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment.”231 The Act addresses the problem by
requiring that employment decisions be based on merit. However, employers may still use age as a criterion in their employment decisions if “age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business . . . .”232 Thus, the ADEA is much less re-

227. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)-(b) (1994).
228. Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees, 141 F.3d 761, 772 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted).
229. Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 831
(8th Cir. 1998) (Battaillon, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504
(U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 98-1235).
230. See Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 58 (1998).
231. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
232. Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1998). See also Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422-23 (1985) (“Unless an employer can
establish a substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all employees above an age
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strictive of government action than the RFRA’s “compelling
government interest” and “least restrictive means” test, and
does not fail under the proportionality limitation to Congress’s
Section 5 power articulated in Boerne.
V. CONCLUSION
As the history of the Eleventh Amendment illustrates, the
tide of Eleventh Amendment immunity has ebbed and flowed
over the past two centuries. Seminole Tribe and Boerne represent the latest major shift in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Under Seminole Tribe, Congress can no longer abrogate
sovereign immunity through Commerce Clause legislation,
leaving Congress’s Section 5 power under the Fourteenth
Amendment as the only source of authority by which Congress
may impinge on the states’ Eleventh Amendment protections.233 Shortly after Seminole Tribe, Boerne extended the
Katzenbach analysis, establishing a more stringent test for determining the validity of Fourteenth Amendment legislation.234
Despite this shift towards broader state immunity, the Supreme Court, if faced with the issue, should hold that states
are not immune from ADEA suits.
There has been much disagreement regarding the type of
language that constitutes an “unmistakably clear” expression
of congressional intent to abrogate immunity. But prior Supreme Court decisions regarding the intent issue provide a
rough framework for analyzing abrogation language. Clearly, a
general authorization for suit is inadequate as an expression of
congressional intent. On the other hand, language that refers
explicitly to the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity
will usually suffice. If the level of clarity lies somewhere between these two extremes, abrogation is usually effective if the
text refers to states or public agencies within the portion of the
text that defines the class of potential defendants. Under Employees, Congress may also be required to refer to the states in
the statute’s enforcement provision, but this requirement is
likely to be imposed only when language within the statute
lack the qualifications required for the position, the age selected for mandatory retirement less than [seventy] must be an age at which it is highly impractical for the employer to [ensure] by individual testing that its employees will have the necessary
qualifications for the job”).
233. See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
234. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-37 (1997).
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creates substantial ambiguity regarding Congress’s intent despite other references to the states.235
Not only does the ADEA include the states within the class
of potential defendants, it incorporates the provision of the
FLSA which specifically authorizes federal court suits against
public agencies. Thus, contrary to the Humenansky court’s
conclusion, the ADEA effectively expresses Congress’s intent to
subject the states to suit in federal court.
The Supreme Court should also reject the Eighth Circuit’s
position on the authority issue and conclude that Congress enacted the ADEA pursuant to the proper immunity-stripping
authority. The Age Act is plainly adapted to Congress’s purpose of prohibiting arbitrary employment decisions on the basis
of age, and, in light of the pervasiveness of this type of discrimination, is not “so ‘sweeping’ that the statute cannot be
seen as proportional to the evil Congress sought to address.”236
By taking Boerne too far in its authority analysis, and by
scrutinizing congressional intent even more rigidly than the
Atascadero standard requires, the Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the ADEA does not effectively abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity from ADEA suits.
Eric Hunter

235. See Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973).
236. Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 1998).

